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This survey reviews the relationship between regulation and distribution, focusing on 
regulatory reform in developing countries. The characteristics of these countries impose 
constraints on appropriate regulatory policies. These constraints condition i) the terms of the 
tradeoff between firms’ rents and efficiency, including the commitment problem in the presence 
of sunk investments, and ii) the probability of success in removing cross subsidies. The choices 
made when reforming infrastructure industries may have a significant impact on perceived 
distribution and development, and this impact will drive attitudes towards reform. Distributive 
problems are channeled through politics and institutions, conditioning the potential solutions to 
the commitment problem. These issues have been extensively explored by the academic 
literature, and provide guidance on how to address second generation regulatory reforms. 
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REGULATORY REFORM, DEVELOPMENT 




The existence of a relationship between regulation and distribution is sometimes simply denied, 
since the dominant objective of regulation, as typically stated both in economic models and in 
economic policy circles, is efficiency.
1 However, a closer look at the evidence and at recent 
academic work leads the observer to think that policy makers, investors and regulatory 
economists would ignore distributive concerns at their peril.  
Evidence from Latin America is especially interesting, since in the 1990s the region was a 
laboratory for regulatory reform. By regulatory reform, we mean the institutional and structural 
changes that took place in infrastructure industries
2 in the 1990s, including liberalization and 
privatization. Kessides (2004, p.11) shows that private investment in infrastructures in 
developing and transition countries peaked at around $130 billion in 1997, but by 2001 had 
fallen to about $60 billion.
3 Privatization activity in developing countries has been unevenly 
distributed, with Latin America accounting for most of the privatizations. Foreign investment 
played an important role. Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, p. 514) report that foreign participation 
in developing countries following privatization reached 76% of total proceeds in 1999, of 
which foreign direct investment accounted for 80%.  
In this paper we review the theoretical and empirical evidence relating regulatory reform to 
development and distribution. We also analyze to what extent some microeconomic policies, 
originally designed in the context of economically advanced countries, require changes when 
applied to developing countries. Furthermore, we seek clues in the academic literature to guide 
                                              
1 Analogously, linking macroeconomics and distribution is seen in some contexts as an oxymoron, since 
macroeconomics is mainly concerned with aggregate phenomena. Bertola (2000) and Bertola et al. (2006) provide 
convincing arguments precisely in the opposite direction. 
 
2 By infrastructure industries we mean those industries that require heavy, highly specific investments in fixed costs, 
usually in the form of physical networks, such as telecommunications, energy, transport, water and sanitation. 
Infrastructure industries, public utilities and network industries are concepts that are often used as synonyms in the 
literature. International institutions and especially the World Bank usually employ the term “infrastructure 
industries.” 
 
3 See also Harris (2003).  
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what some have called “second generation” reforms
4 aimed at providing stability and 
permanence to foreign private investment in the infrastructure sectors in developing countries, 
most notably in Latin America. Kessides (2004, p. 52), in a study commissioned by the World 
Bank, reports survey data from the “Latinobarómetro” about the public’s sentiment vis-à-vis 
privatization. Comparing answers in 1998, 2000 and 2002 the percentage of the population 
who disapproved of privatization policies had increased in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru. Whereas in most of these countries the figure was around 40% in 
1998, it had increased to well above 60% in all those countries in 2002. In 2002 nearly 90% of 
Argentineans and 80% of Chileans polled disapproved of privatization, “despite demonstrable 
improvements in the performance of privatized firms.” 
This “disillusionment”
5 has been driven, according to Kessides, by “employee layoffs, price 
increases, perceived long delays in benefits, and the distributional impacts of privatization.” 
Recent political unrest in some Latin American countries (such as Argentina and Bolivia) has 
focused, inter alia, on the role of foreign private investment. 
Although historically the emphasis of regulatory economics has been on efficiency, the 
attention paid to distributional concerns is not new. Distributive issues are actually at the core 
of some regulatory dilemmas, such as the tradeoff between rent and efficiency (by which to 
achieve efficient results, such as high investment, some positive rent levels must be guaranteed 
to regulated firms), and the tension between liberalization and cross subsidies (by which prices 
are above cost in some regulated segments to fund the deficits in high cost or politically 
sensitive segments).  
If dilemmas relating to firms’ rents and efficiency exist in democratic societies with high 
inequality, the existence of political problems when these rents are made more transparent (for 
example, through well audited foreign multinationals) should not be surprising. At least since 
the 1960s, inequality in Latin American countries has been higher than in any other region of 
the world.  
In this paper we review the literature on these issues, and argue that regulatory reforms
6 should 
be devised taking into account the specific features of developing countries, including income 
inequality. We report that regulatory reforms have been perceived to have an unbalanced 
impact on different population segments, and that institutions are a key ingredient to 
understanding the link between regulatory reform and development. There are other studies 
that survey regulation and development; see for example Cook et al. (2004). But ours is the first 
that focuses simultaneously on the tradeoff between rent and efficiency, and on the relationship 
between institutional issues and this tradeoff. 
                                              
4 See for example Krueger (2000), Basanes and Willig (2001) and Kessides (2004). 
 
5 Gómez-Ibáñez (2003, p. 342) argues that “continuing frustration over economic reforms associated with 
privatization, or continuing disputes among consumers, investors, and governments about the fairness of regulated 
prices, may eventually reduce popular support for private infrastructure to the breaking point.” He adds that “the 
perception of fairness is as important as the reality, so that regulation is as much a political as a technical act.” 
 
6 Estache et al. (2005) identify three main drivers behind the regulatory reform process. The first one, a 
favorable ideology to market oriented reforms, was spurred by previous experiences in the UK and Chile. 
Technological changes also brought about new perspectives for the emergence of competition in 
segments of industries which were traditionally regarded as “natural monopolies” in their entirety. 
Finally, the fiscal crisis which mainly affected developing countries in the 1980s and mid-1990s reduced 
the sustainability of financial coverage of largely inefficient public enterprises.  
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Our focus is on infrastructure industries, including (but not limiting ourselves to) 
telecommunications, in Latin America, although some lessons may be relevant for other regions 
as well. We focus on democracies, reflecting the trend towards democratization in developing 
countries in the recent past. Indeed, the increasing role of democracy in Latin American 
countries has been one of the common features of the region in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries, in contrast to a not-so-distant past plagued by military dictatorships. 
The rest of this survey is organized as follows: In Section 2 we address the issue of how 
distributive concerns and the specific features of developing countries condition regulation and 
other policies related to the infrastructure sector. In Section 3 we analyze the actual impact of 
regulatory reform packages on development and distribution, both from a microeconomic and a 
macroeconomic point of view. Section 4 tackles a number of institutional issues, following the 
view that the main obstacles to reform are political and institutional. In particular, we focus on 
the regulatory independence debate, on governance issues, and on regulatory capture. Although 
the sections are topic oriented, Section 2 is more (although not exclusively) focused on theory 
and Section 3 on empirical studies, whereas Section 4 is more balanced in terms of contents. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests areas of future research. 
2. Distribution and Reform Constraints in Developing Countries 
In this section, we explore how efficiency and distributive concerns are related in theory, and 
why this relationship is an important ingredient of the constraints that regulatory reform faces 
in developing countries. 
A typical regulatory relationship can be summarized with the following simple model (see 
Evans et al., 2006): A regulated firm chooses investment in Period 1 to maximize the expected 
discounted sum of two periods’ profits, where in Period 2 the regulator fixes a price for the 
service provided by the firm. Let i be the investment level chosen by the firm; then the firm’s 
objective function is: 
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( i f k p D c p i + − − + − = Θ δ , 
where  δ is the discount factor, ρ is the price decided by the regulator in Period 2, cis the 
marginal cost, and k  is the fixed cost. Investment in Period 1 leads to a lowering of fixed costs 
() f i  in Period 2, with the assumptions  '0 , f > '' 0 f < and  () ' 0 . f =∞ If the regulator only 
cares about consumer surplus, then it chooses  p  to maximize consumers’ net surplus  () S p , 
subject to the firm’s second period break-even constraint,() ( ) ( ) 0. pc D p k f i −− + ≥  The 
standard result is that the constraint binds, so there is no incentive to invest, and it must 
therefore be compared to the first-best investment level. This is achieved by 
maximizing () , i fi δ −+  so the first-best investment level is given by  () '1 . fi δ ∗ =  This can be 
achieved by committing, in the first period, to a price that makes first-best investment 
worthwhile, that is, second period profits must be positive so as to remunerate such an 
investment. But the ability to commit depends on endogenous country characteristics that will 
be examined in the rest of this survey. 
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In the benchmark theorems about the social desirability of market economies (the two welfare 
theorems and the Coase theorem), the attainment of efficiency and the attainment of 
distributive objectives are separable problems. In the case of the Coase theorem,
7 for example, 
in the absence of wealth effects and transaction costs, if property rights are well specified, 
decentralized solutions obtained through bargaining are efficient. The concept of an efficient 
solution is compatible with different initial allocations of property rights. However, different 
allocations of property rights give rise to different distributions as part of efficient solutions (of 
course, if wealth effects are significant, these different distributions are an obstacle to the 
attainment of efficiency). Milgrom and Roberts (1990), in the context of the economics of 
organization, point out that a particular sort of transaction cost, namely bargaining costs, 
usually prevent efficiency and distribution from being separable. To the extent that efficiency is 
compatible with a number of different distributive solutions, agents will bargain to achieve the 
one that is closest to their interests. This sort of bargaining introduces costs, and these costs 
may outweigh potential efficiency gains. 
In regulated sectors, if efficiency and distribution were separable, there would be no problem 
with gearing regulatory decisions towards efficiency and leaving other areas of government to 
care about distribution. However, some characteristics of regulated sectors, and the particular 
attributes of these sectors in developing countries, which we review in the rest of this section, 
make these two concerns far from separable.  
The notion that regulation has to be perceived as “fair” to be sustainable has been 
acknowledged both in developing and in developed countries (see Zajac, 1995). Hence for 
example the requirement in the US for a “fair rate of return” on assets invested in a regulatory 
project, which goes beyond the requirement of efficiency. The tension between efficiency and 
distribution has surfaced in competition or antitrust policy as well, where some have advocated 
the use, as a policy objective, of consumer surplus maximization as opposed to social welfare 
maximization, based on the informational (Besanko and Spulber, 1993) and political (Neven 
and Röller, 2005) weakness of consumers in the face of producers’ interests. The orthodox 
response to this (see Motta, 2004, ch. 1) has been that, i) by definition, efficiency has to take 
into account the interests of all agents in society, including producers, stressing also that, in 
many developed countries, consumers also share producers’ interests through shared ownership, 
pension funds and other forms of investment; and ii) in practice, a concern for the long run 
welfare of consumers will seldom be in contradiction to the welfare of the members of society 
as a whole. Then, if distribution is a concern, there are other, better instruments with which it 
can be achieved.  
An insightful counter-argument used by those who are against the application of distributive 
concerns to regulation and competition or antitrust policy is that local justice (the justice 
related to a particular market or a particular arena – see Elster, 1992) is not necessarily 
correlated with global justice (justice in society at large). For example high prices for consumers 
with more inelastic demand may hurt poorer or richer consumers depending on the particular 
product or geographical market.
8 The validity of this argument is an empirical question that 
will be addressed in Section 3 below. 
 
                                              
7 See Coase (1960). 
8 See Rey et al. (2005).  
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Although historically the emphasis of regulatory economics has been on efficiency, the 
attention paid to distributional concerns is not new. Distributive issues are actually at the core 
of some regulatory dilemmas: 
•  There is a tradeoff between rent and efficiency. In many settings, if the regulator wants 
to achieve efficient allocations, it must give up costly rents to the firms. The traditional 
Loeb and Magat scheme
9 is the easiest way to see this. In a simple setting with linear 
demand  () D p and keeping the assumption of constant marginal costs (and ignoring 
investment), if the regulator can transfer subsidies to the firm, but wants to leave price 
discretion to the operator, and if the subsidy is made equal to the area between demand 
and marginal cost, the firm will price at marginal cost to maximize producer surplus. In 
this case producer surplus equals total surplus and first-best efficiency is achieved, but 
at the cost of extreme inequality, since consumers are left with zero surplus. A regulator 
could safely do this if it valued producer and consumers rents equally or if raising 
money for transfers through taxation did not have a social cost in terms of distortions 
in other (competitive) markets. More generally, in models with asymmetric information, 
providing incentives to the firm to make costly efforts or sunk investments, or to reveal 
the true information about costs entails giving up costly rents as part of second-best 
solutions.
10 
•  Cross subsidies
11 have historically been and still are in many countries a way to 
overcome the dilemma between allocative efficiency and distortionary taxation. 
Marginal cost pricing for a natural monopoly involves a deficit for the firm that has to 
be covered through distortionary taxation, whereas uniform average cost pricing leaves 
some consumers (usually the poorest) unserved. Then fixing a price above average cost 
for those more willing to pay, and a price below average costs for those less willing to 
pay, allows the regulator to achieve an allocation whereby the quantities sold maximize 
total surplus, and which at the same time is both financially feasible and politically 
appealing from a distributional point of view. However, if at some point liberalization is 
contemplated as a desirable option, the entry of new firms will start with the segments 
of those willing to pay more (for example urban and business segments) and hence 
entry will undermine cross subsidization.
12  
•  In the absence of information asymmetries, the task of the regulator would be simple if 
there were no commitment or capture problems. There is actually a thin line between 
avoiding both capture and commitment problems. In fact, in the absence of 
commitment, some degree of capture may be “used” to give up those costly rents that 
are necessary to provide incentives for efficiency-oriented innovation. For example, the 
regulator may not want to know about the firm’s costs if that unleashes the ratchet 
                                              
9  See Loeb and Magat (1979). 
10 See Armstrong and Sappington (2003). 
11 See Beato (2002). 
12 Entry would also undermine Ramsey-Boiteux prices, i.e. the structure of prices that optimally satisfies the firm’s 
breakeven constraint, whereby the higher prices are prices above marginal costs the more inelastic the demand. 
Ramsey prices are actually another instance of the tension between efficiency and distributional politics, since 
inelastic demand is often disproportionately concentrated in the poorest segments of the population. However, these 
political reasons, as well as heavy information requirements, are usually blamed for the scarce use of Ramsey tariffs 
in practice.  
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effect,
13 or it may be desirable that consumer/voters do not have a high degree of 
information on regulatory policies because that would reduce the clout of firms as 
lobbies and would not secure the rents they need to make investments worthwhile in 
the absence of commitment (see more on commitment and capture in Section 4). 
In relation to this, recent studies on regulation and privatization of infrastructure industries in 
developing countries start by mentioning a number of characteristics of developing countries, 
many of them linked to distributive issues, which should be taken into account when designing 
microeconomic policies.
14 Laffont (2005) mentions the following characteristics:  
•  Higher deadweight costs of public funds due to distortionary taxation. The under-
development of tax systems implies that collecting one dollar is significantly more 
costly in developing than in developed economies. World Bank estimates report a 
deadweight loss exceeding 1 for each unit of funds to be raised against a 0.3 in 
developed countries. A high cost of the tax system, coupled with enormous social needs 
and high inequality, entails high pressure to redistribute any rents known to be 
generated. In particular, there is a high short term opportunity cost of complying with 
the commitment not to expropriate the quasi-rents necessary to remunerate the sunk 
investments in infrastructure sectors. 
•  Higher costs of auditing and enforcement. The inefficiency of the public sector and 
absence of a well trained bureaucracy form the basis of the problems of under-
developed institutions in enforcing private contracts. 
•  Private ordering instead of the rule of law. The behavior of public servants is often 
shortsighted and dominated by private concerns, translating into relatively low 
standards of probity in public administration in a number of countries, going so far as 
cronyism and corruption. 
•  Lesser ability to enter into long term contracts. Institutions charged with protecting 
property rights are usually informal, and arenas where agents can engage in credible 
long term commitments are relatively unusual in less developed countries (LDCs). 
Poorly protected private property rights and under-developed business codes of 
behavior are the norm in many of these countries. 
 
The list of special features of developing countries that affect privatization processes should be 
supplemented, according to Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005), with the following features: 
•  Imperfectly competitive and incomplete markets. Existing producers often have high 
market power and there is an absence or scarcity of markets (typically, financial 
markets) where agents with different allocations across states of nature and over time 
can exchange their endowments. 
 
                                              
13 The ratchet effect is the unwillingness to reveal its type or to make an effort by an agent, when he or she 
anticipates that the positive results of this action will be “expropriated” by some other agent (the “principal”) in the 
future. See Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
14 See also Soria (2005).  
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•  Regionalized and sometimes ethnically distinct labor markets, with appointments 
through connections. Labor markets are thin, and the absence of meritocratic 
appointments reduces the incentives to invest in human capital. This translates into 
management weaknesses and patronage in appointments at firms and regulatory 
institutions. 
The combination of Laffont’s and Parker and Kirkpatrick’s features gives an idea of the 
complications that arise in regulatory reform policies in developing countries, and in Latin 
America in particular.  
Laffont further explores how industry and market structures,
15 power of incentives,
16 access 
prices and universal service should differ in the light of such specific characteristics. Although 
we refer the reader to Laffont (2005) for further details, the general conclusion is that policies 
that would be efficient in developed countries (such as price caps or other “incentive 
regulation” mechanisms) are much more difficult to sustain in developing countries. 
The study presented in Estache, Perelman and Trujillo (2005), based on 1,000 contracts in Latin 
America, shows that there was a tendency in favor of price caps (used to regulate 56% of the 
contracts) vis-à-vis rate or return regulation (20% of the cases). However, the same authors 
point out that the “initial enthusiasm for the inclusion of efficiency in the design of regulation 
in developing countries is, however, being adjusted in developments observed over the last 2-3 
years.” In that respect, they observe a tendency away from “pure” price or revenue cap regimes 
in favor of “hybrid” regimes which entail some pass-through of costs to consumers, most 
notably in activities subject to exchange risks and those involving negotiated long-term 
arrangements (e.g. labor contracts). The other tendency they observe is the increasing interest in 
national and international performance benchmarking (yardstick competition) in LDCs, albeit 
with slow progress. Also, the slowdown in the volumes of private capital in financing 
infrastructures in LDCs since the 1997 East Asia crisis leads the authors to conclude that “the 
next generation of contracts seems to be moving towards management contracts” and that “the 
public sector will continue to be an important actor.” 
The issue of contract renegotiation with a focus upon LDCs, and in particular the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, is studied by Guasch et al. (2002), who combine game-
theory analysis and empirical evidence. In a context where concessions and privatizations, 
rather than management contracts, were the “salient modes of private sector participation,” 
contractual incompleteness and imperfect enforcement leads to a wide scope for renegotiation 
of contracts. The inherently higher risk entailed by price capping schemes tends to exacerbate 
the tendency towards renegotiation. The authors find that the existence of an independent 
regulator
17 significantly reduces the probability of renegotiations and increases the quality of 
enforcement by better commitment. 
 
                                              
15 Focusing on the electricity industry, Holburn and Spiller (2002) argue that it is a myth that economies of scale in 
generation limit the potential for competition in small markets. However, Jamasb (2006) argues that electricity retail 
competition should remain a long term objective in most developing countries, due to implementation costs. On how 
some small developing countries are able to develop competitive market structures in telecommunications, see Spiller 
and Cardilli (1997). 
16 Guasch (2004) shows that price caps are a positive determinant of contract renegotiation (the same result is 
reported in Laffont, 2005). 
17 See Section 4.  
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The issues relating to Universal Service Obligation (USO) are particularly prominent in the LDC 
context, especially when urban areas with low costs of access provision are open to competition 
and cross-subsidization becomes unfeasible. Universal service is often seen as one important 
aspect of economic development per se, most notably as the expansion of the network has not 
reached rural areas in many parts of LDCs. The aforementioned high cost of public funds, and 
therefore the high deadweight loss caused by redistribution through taxation, implies that USO 
policies are often seen as a sensible instrument for the redistribution of income. 
Laffont (2005) develops an insightful theoretical model, based on asymmetric information, of 
USO policies, and shows that uniform pricing policies distort incentives and therefore 
exacerbate the problem of the limited expansion of the network in rural areas. He points out 
that when competition is introduced in low-cost areas, new methods of financing access in 
high-cost areas must be put in place, for instance via taxation of the industry or on a broader 
basis.
18  
One conclusion which can be widely agreed upon as emerging from the literature is that policy-
makers do need to take distribution concerns seriously into account when designing effective 
universal service policies. Universal service programs
19 should create special funds (from all 
operators that achieve a given market share, or from general taxation if the tax system is well-
developed enough), using the vertical chain of government to carefully target subsidies. It also 
appears that direct subsidies are usually preferable to cross subsidies because they do not 
jeopardize liberalization, but they must run in parallel with fiscal policy reform and with an 
improvement in the quality of government. Otherwise, we would be back to the previous stage, 
where company deficits were financed through opaque fiscal deficits. 
We thus observe that optimal regulatory policies in developing countries face a number of 
additional constraints. Most of these additional constraints exacerbate the trade-off between 
rents and efficiency, and hence add distributive demands to optimal policies, generally making 
reform more difficult to implement or sustain. Policies need to take distribution concerns 
seriously into account, designing effective universal service policies.  
3. The Effects of Reforms  
3.1. The Impact of Reform Packages on Distribution 
In this sub-section we explore inequality measures and survey studies that analyze the impact 
of particular reform packages on inequality and income groups.  
At least since the 1960s, inequality in Latin American countries has been higher than in any 
other region of the world (see de Ferranti et al., 2003). With the exception of countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, the difference in Gini coefficients between Latin America and other regions is 
large. This gap narrowed in the 1970s and became wider again in the 1980s. There was no clear 
pattern in the 1990s, when Latin America performed better than some regions in distributional 
terms (for example Eastern Europe) and worse than others (for example, South Asia). It is 
sometimes argued that inequality is related to the state of development in a country and 
                                              
18 For references to specific universal service schemes targeted at the poor, see Estache et al. (2002). 
19 Chisari et al. (2003) describe and evaluate the different universal service policies existing in Latin America.  
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comparisons should therefore be made that control for this factor. Even controlling for this 
factor, however, the authors who present this evidence conclude that the Latin American region 
suffers from high “excess inequality.” 
 
Table 1 
Gini Coefficients by Region 




48.4 50.8 52.2 50.5 
Asia  40.2 40.4 41.2 40.6 
OECD  32.3 32.5 34.2 33.0 
Source: de Ferranti et al. (2003) 
 
In 2003, the richest tenth of the population of Latin America and the Caribbean earned 48% of 
total income, while the poorest tenth earned only 1.6%. In industrialized countries, by contrast, 
the top tenth received 29.1%, while the bottom tenth earned 2.5%. 
Inequality would not be a problem for the private sector investment in infrastructure services if 
markets and institutions worked perfectly.
20 Financial markets would allow the implementation 
of any positive net present value project and private contracts or contracts between the public 
sector and the private sector would be enforced by well functioning institutions. If inequality 
has any impact on investment, it must be because some markets and/or institutions do not 
work perfectly. We contend that more attention should be paid to the fact that inequality 
triggers political dissatisfaction (because some markets do not distribute resources to the 
satisfaction of policies, and some policies do not reach the poor sufficiently or have an impact 
on some sectors such as middle and lower classes which is perceived to be negative), which in 
turn makes commitment to reward investment difficult. With that perspective in mind, in this 
section we focus on distributive issues, in particular on what the impact of regulatory reform 
on consumers has been and to see to what extent this impact may be a source of 
dissatisfaction.  
Harris (2003) and Estache et al. (2002) agree that private investment in infrastructure has been 
a key factor, in some cases, in expanding the number of connected households. They also agree, 
however, that since tariffs were usually below average costs in the past, whenever private sector 
involvement has been accompanied by hardening budget constraints for governments (which 
has not always been the case according to Engel et al., 2003) tariff rebalancing (the unwinding 
of cross subsidies) has posed a big political problem. McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) provide 
an overview of the distributive impact of the privatization of utilities on four Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua). They observe no common pattern 
                                              
20 See Banerjee (2004).  
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concerning price changes associated with privatizations, but the price effects were almost 
always outweighed in welfare terms by gains in service access among the poor, although they 
admit that the empirical studies are severely constrained by the partial nature of the available 
data. 
Consumer welfare measurement provides a methodology to evaluate the differential impact of 
regulatory reform across consumer groups. The surplus for a fixed number of consumers is 
often approximated in empirical studies as the price difference multiplied by a quantity which 
can be the initial one, the final one or the average. In the case of zero elasticity it suffices to 
consider the initial quantity. This is the procedure used in Ugaz and Waddams-Price (2003); 
they measure consumer surplus for several income groups to quantify the impact on welfare of 
privatizations and associated regulatory reforms for several groups of consumers. This can be 
used to assess the impact of these policies on inequality and poverty using expenditure surveys, 
although the methodology suffers from the same problems of any study that analyzes the 
evolution of variables before and after a change in policy: it is difficult to establish causality 
links, given that other potential factors are not accounted for, although a (not always credible) 
counterfactual is usually established. This is a typical problem of privatization studies, 
according to Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, p. 515). In spite of this, such studies contribute a 
great deal of information towards understanding the different reactions vis-à-vis privatization 
and regulatory reform.  
One of the empirical applications that uses consumer surpluses consists of estimating the 
welfare derived from new products (see Hausman, 1998) or the welfare gains for new 
consumers. This is what Delfino and Casarin (2003) do for the case of the Buenos Aires region 
in Argentina. These authors start with the assumption of a linear demand functionQ ab P =− . 




M S PP Q =− , where  M P  is the vertical intercept of the demand function, and  1 P  and  1 Q  












Therefore, consumer surplus can also be expressed as:  
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which can be used to estimate welfare gains for new consumers in scenarios with different 
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access (access tariffs and equipment rental) is subtracted are very small or even negative for 
some services and below some assumptions on elasticities, although infrastructures reached a 
higher proportion of the population.   
In Torero and Pascó-Font (2003), the case of Peru is analyzed. In the first phase, a Probit model 
of the determinants of the probability of having access to a service is estimated, such as for 
telephony or electricity: 
 , 
 
where ins P   is the price of installation, CO indicates the degree of access for the zone, and INC is 
household income. There are sociological variables added, such as race or educational level. 
From this equation the inverse Mill ratio is obtained, to correct for the fact that not all the 
population has access to the service. The inverse Mill ratio adjusts the average error term in 
the second stage model, given that it does not necessarily have to be 0, as a consequence of the fact 
that the second sample includes only “connected” households. This ratio is then included in the 
estimation in the second stage, that is, in the demand equations, to obtain the price elasticities and 




where it is also possible to add sociological variables, and where IMR is the inverse Mill ratio, 
which depends on the probability of being connected according to the model estimated in the 
first stage. The results for Peru are that there are clear gains for consumers from the reforms of 
the telecommunications sector in the 1990s, but not for the energy and water sectors. 
More generally, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2005, p. 525)
21 summarize the existing evidence on the 
impact of privatizations in developing countries by saying that “the relationship between 
privatization and performance improvement is complex and superior post-privatization 
performance is not axiomatic. The evidence reveals that introducing more market competition 
and effective state regulation may be crucial in ensuring that economic performance improves. 
In addition, a wider range of institutional issues, including improving political, legal, 
management and financial capacity within countries will affect the impact of privatization on 
performance when privatization occurs in low-income countries.”
22 The bulk of the evidence 
on privatization in developing countries is restricted to the telecommunications sector, 
reflecting the fact that most privatizations have taken place in this sector due to technological 
changes and growth in demand. The few exceptions in electricity or water illustrate that the 
success of privatization is indeed possible in terms of higher productivity and improved access 
                                              
21 These authors suggest that some of the existing empirical studies of privatization do not always address 
satisfactorily a number of methodological problems, such as the choice of counterfactual elements, excessive reliance 
on accounting data, other data inconsistencies, performance measurement, and causality – good economic 
performance might lead to privatization rather than vice versa. For a comprehensive survey of empirical studies of 
privatization not restricted to developing countries, see Megginson (2005). 
22 For evidence along these lines, see Galal et al. (1994), Ros (1999) and Wallsten (2001). López de Silanes and Chong 
(2003) summarize the empirical evidence on Latin American privatizations, arguing that the manner in which 
privatization is carried out matters. Transparency and homogeneity of procedures, speed, and limited restructuring 
prior to privatization lead to better outcomes and less room for corruption and discretion. They also conclude that 
the success of privatization is enhanced by new regulations and good corporate governance. 
  ... ln ) Pr( 3 2 1 INC CO P a ins β β β + + =
  ... ln ) ln( ) ln( 3 2 1 0 + + + + = IMR INC P Q i i β β β β 
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and quality conditions, but also highlight the possibility of institutional conflict between 
government and investors, and the need to accompany privatization by a sound regulatory 
framework and a feasible competition regime. 
What is the link between the impact of regulatory reform on different income groups and 
political attitudes towards reform? Santhakumar (2006) and Martimort and Straub (2006) 
provide empirical and theoretical perspectives, respectively, on this issue. Santhakumar (2006) 
analyzes survey data about attitudes towards reform in the electricity sector in India and 
reports that those states with more connected households and average quality of service are 
more prone to oppose reforms such as privatization, because in these states subsidies to 
electricity consumption are the highest and the gains in terms of newly connected households 
derived from privatization are minimal. His is, however, a study of initial opposition to reform 
and not of backlash against existing reforms. Martimort and Straub (2006) build a model 
motivated by the backlash against privatization in Latin America. They argue that with public 
ownership the costs are concentrated among dispersed and disorganized tax payers who carry 
the burden of the soft budget constraint problem. With private ownership the soft budget 
constraint no longer applies in their model, but well publicized (higher than before 
privatization) prices concentrated among the connected middle classes can determine a scenario 
characterized by a strong political opposition compatible with improvements in efficiency. 
Harris (2003) analyzes the impact of reforms on the poor, and reports several cases (notably in 
Chile and Colombia) where private sector involvement has been accompanied by high levels of 
network expansion in water, sanitation and electricity, as compared with places still under 
public provision. However, as reported in Easterly and Servén (2003), infrastructure expansion 
in Latin America in general has been below the expectations raised at the beginning of the 
1990s. Harris (2003) also points out that the connected poor, since they spend a higher 
proportion of their income on utilities services, have suffered disproportionately from tariff 
increases that have been necessary to attract private investors, and that subsidies to the poor 
have in several instances not been well enough targeted. 
Reform may also have a desirable distributive feature. Engel et al. (2003) argue that concession 
contracts to private investors (such as Build, Operate, Transfer, or BOT contracts, used for 
example in toll highway franchising) distribute resources from consumers to taxpayers, if 
franchises perform under a hard budget constraint (costs have to be covered through tariffs, 
and not through taxation). If the consumer population is not the total population, as is the case 
with highways, this may have an equalizing impact on income distribution.
23 However, Engel et 
al. (2003) report that many of these franchises in Latin America (they analyze cases from 
Argentina, Chile and Colombia) were renegotiated and finally did require public funds for cost 
overruns. They propose that, to avoid such problems in the future, concessions should be 
accompanied by sectoral regulation separated from ministries to deal with post-contractual 
hazards, and that franchise periods should be variable to reduce demand risk. 
Leipziger et al. (1999) find that public provision does not benefit the poor, but conclude that, 
with private provision, the public sector must keep a role as regulator and as provider of well-
targeted subsidies. They argue that the weaker the regulation, the less protected are the interests 
of the poor. 
                                              
23 In addition, average cost pricing has the desirable feature that it is consumer demand, and not public sector 
planning, that is the key factor in deciding which projects are built at all (this is the traditional Coasian argument in 
favour of average cost pricing; see Coase, 1946, and Laffont, 2000).  
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Table 2 
Studies of the Impact of Regulatory Reform on Welfare and Distribution 
Fink, Mattoo and 
Rathindran (2002) 





programs including competition, 
privatization and regulatory 
independence foster 
penetration and efficiency; less 
benefits if competition is 
introduced after privatization 
McKenzie and Mookherjee 
(2003) 
Distributive impact of 
privatization in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua 
Effects of higher prices were 
compensated by gain in access, 
in welfare terms 
Delfino and Casarin (2003) 
 
Consumer surplus in Buenos 
Aires following the diffusion of 
infrastructure 
Gains for consumers are small 
once cost of access is 
considered 
Torero and Pascó-Font 
(2003) 
Estimation of consumer welfare 
effects of reforms in Peru in the 
1990s 
Positive effects for 
telecommunications, not for 
energy and water 
Santhakumar (2006)  Attitudes towards reforms in the 
electricity sector in India 
More opposition to privatization 
in states with higher connection 
and quality of services 
Harris (2003)  Impact of privatization on the 
poor in Latin America 
Benefits from network 
expansion, but severe harm 
from tariff increases 
Engel, Fischer, Galetovic 
(2003) 
Effects of concession contracts 
to private investors in Latin 
America 
They tend to transfer from 
consumers to taxpayers, but the 
latter are usually involved in 
covering cost overruns 
Leipziger, Estache and 
Gómez-Lobo (1999) 
Impact of privatization on the 
poor in Latin America 
Public provision does not 
benefit the poor, but 
privatization should be coupled 
with strong regulatory 
enforcement to protect the poor 
 
Table 2 summarizes the main empirical studies reviewed in this section. The direct impact of 
reforms on consumer welfare (consumer surplus changes) is not the only one that matters, since 
populations will also be affected by the indirect macroeconomic effects of reforms. 
Furthermore, the ways direct and indirect effects of policies impact on political attitudes, as 
well as the vehicles by which those attitudes are translated into political behavior and finally 
into policy decisions, depend on the role of institutions. Consequently, the analysis of the 
relationship between regulatory reform, development and inequality would be incomplete 
without looking at the macroeconomic effects (Sub-section 3.2) and without looking at 
regulatory institutions (Section 4). 
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3.2. The Impact of Regulatory Reform on Macroeconomic Performance 
We now turn towards the relationship between markets and microeconomic policies, on the one 
hand, and macroeconomic outcomes on the other hand. The link between micro policies and 
macro performance, such as productivity, growth, inflation or financial stabilization, is in 
general a complex field lacking a critical mass of research, despite its clear relevance. 
Macroeconomic variables condition the decisions about microeconomic policies and therefore 
we would like to know how aspects such as competition or liberalization affect macroeconomic 
issues. In developing countries many privatization projects were carried out under the pressure 
of increasing fiscal deficit and in many cases utilities reform was justified as part and parcel of 
an economic policy agenda aimed at reinvigorating economic growth.
24 
Although targeting some macroeconomic objectives with microeconomic instruments (initially 
devised with the “simple” objective of improving efficiency in particular markets) may often 
not be ideal or efficient, it may be part of a political equilibrium. Therefore, it is useful to 
explore the costs and benefits of targeting macroeconomic goals with microeconomic 
instruments (in this case, regulatory reform). This is precisely what is done in Easterly and 
Servén (2003). 
The reduction in investment and public expenditure in infrastructure as part of the economic 
adjustment of Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s is equivalent, according to 
these authors, to replacing debt with 9% interest with debt with 20% interest or even more. 
Instead of new debt, what took place in most Latin American countries was a cut in public 
sector expenditure on maintenance and construction of infrastructure. Such expenditures are 
estimated to have a high social rate of return (they give specific examples ranging from 19% to 
117%).
25 Cutting expenditure on a project that has a high rate of return is economically 
equivalent to acquiring debt with a high interest rate: both policies free resources today, in 
exchange for fewer resources tomorrow. 
Easterly and Servén are of the view that in the 1980s it had indeed become necessary to 
improve the health of public finances and that the state economic leadership model was 
exhausted. What these authors believe to be questionable is the extent to which public 
expenditure on infrastructure should carry the burden of the cut in fiscal deficit. Latin 
American countries, although with important internal variations, conform to the pattern that is 
also described in other studies, according to which infrastructure expenditure in LDCs often 
suffers a disproportionate compression in times of fiscal austerity. Such compression is largely 
due to the myopic use of the ratio between the current budget deficit and the GNP as a measure 
of fiscal performance, while the only fiscal constraint that matters economically is the 
intertemporal fiscal constraint. Similar criteria of fiscal illusion were used by the EU countries 
on the occasion of the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria for the creation of the single 
                                              
24 Other examples of the link between micro and macro, in this case affecting more developed countries, are the 
“packages” of liberalizing policies to lower inflation, or in general the attempts (through price controls or other 
interventions) by regional or national governments, who do not have (perhaps because they have voluntarily 
transferred it, as in the Euro zone) currency sovereignty and hence lack monetary policy instruments, to fight 
inflation differentials. Similarly, many governments in developed countries are under political pressure to “do 
something” to fight the outsourcing of local firms or plants of foreign multi-nationals that in the past had 
established themselves on national soil. 
25 The impact of infrastructure investment on growth can be high if the investment is carried out both by the public 
or the private sector. See for example, in the transport sector, Banister and Berechman (2000).  
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currency in the 1990s, which coincided with a significant increase in privatizations in countries 
such as Spain and Italy. 
Private provision of infrastructure is seen by these authors as a promising formula, but with 
few exceptions (which can be found especially in the telecommunications sector) this is a 
process that finds itself at a very preliminary stage. Even where private provision is feasible, the 
transition from state to private ownership must be thought through very carefully. Opening up 
infrastructures to the private sector may make a great deal of sense, but cutting expenditure in 
infrastructures with a high rate of return and waiting for the private sector to take over 
overnight is called by Easterly and Servén a “leap of faith.” After an exhaustive empirical 
study, the authors conclude that opening up infrastructure industries to the participation of the 
private sector has offered mixed results and has not resolved the infrastructure problems in 
Latin America.  
Among the empirical results that these authors present, they find that public infrastructure 
expenditure has a superior impact on growth when it strongly complements private capital. 
Moreover, they point out that there is no reason to expect that opening up infrastructure 
investment to the private sector will attract sufficient investment to compensate public cuts, for 
two reasons: 
•  Private investment requires an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework.  
•  Complementarity and substitutability characteristics between public and private capital 
may differ across industries. 
In fact there is scarce evidence that the decreasing trend in public infrastructure investment has 
been accompanied by a symmetrically increasing involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of infrastructures. In some cases, higher private investment was accompanied by 
higher public investment, suggesting that the public and private sectors often play 
complementary roles. The authors stress that the only sector where the positive expected 
reaction from the private sector did emerge was the telecommunications industry. 
The substantial impact of infrastructures on growth documented by Easterly and Servén (2003) 
suggests that the fiscal adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s represented a highly inefficient way 
to adjust public finances. 
Campos et al. (2003) quantify the macroeconomic effects of private sector participation in 
infrastructure for 21 Latin American countries between 1985 and 1998, although they recognize 
the data shortcomings of their exercise and the lack of a theoretical model on which they can 
base their hypotheses. They find that transport reform (airports, ports, railways, roads) has had 
a significant effect on per capita income, but that utility reform (electricity, gas, sanitation, 
water, and telecommunications) has no significant effect. 
The expenditure, price and tax implications of infrastructure industry reforms extend to all 
activities, and therefore a general equilibrium approach would be the most appropriate method 
of evaluation. However, data availability and lack of communication between sub-disciplines of 
economics has limited the production of such studies. One exception is Benítez et al. (2003) for 
the case of the reforms in Argentina. Although these authors point out that the reform of 
utilities in Argentina had a positive effect on national welfare and on distribution, the gains  
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from reform were insufficient to offset the losses from the credit shocks
26 that the Argentinean 
economy experienced in the 1990s. They rely on a general equilibrium model of the 
Argentinean economy calibrated for 1993, isolating the distributional effects of utility reform 
from the impact of other reforms taking place in the country during the 1990s. All agents gain 
from increases in productivity and access, but the welfare gains are offset by financial crises. 
To summarize this section, the empirical results on the impact of reform policies on the welfare 
of different income groups of consumers are inconclusive. Improved access rates in some areas 
(although in a context of insufficient infrastructure expansion) are probably compensated by 
higher and more transparent charges for some groups. The cuts in public infrastructure 
investment, which accompanied policies to involve the private sector, have done more harm 
than good to the overall macroeconomic impact of reform policies in highly unequal societies. 
4. Institutions 
4.1. Why Do Institutions Matter in Infrastructure Industries? 
Institutions matter in any field of economic policy. For example, the econometric treatment of 
the effects of good institutions
27 on macroeconomic performance is a very active field of 
research, and is increasingly inspiring empirical research in microeconomic policies. Dixit 
(2005) reviews and criticizes this literature. He finds little usefulness in terms of policy 
prescriptions, and regards with skepticism the tendency to derive recipes from “pure” economic 
analysis, which should always be complemented by in-depth knowledge of country specificities. 
In Dixit (2004, p.153) he claims that “institution design or reform is often posed as a matter of 
binary choices – shock therapy versus gradualism, mimicking western laws versus keeping 
national or local customs. But this is too simplistic. The best choices typically will be more 
subtle mixtures of speeds and features that work well in combination; the theory is starting to 
reveal the desirable complementarities.” Credible commitments are seen as one of the few 
recommendations that survive after many studies, although the recommendation leaves “broad 
space to fill in the details.” Furthermore, he criticizes the role of international institutions, but 
agrees with those that see them as “facilitators” which allow countries to keep the “ownership” 
of reforms, while providing them with some discipline. On the other hand, Henisz et al. (2004) 
state that reforms should not be perceived by local populations as imposed by some distant 
foreign institution, and that foreign investors gain from associating themselves with local 
operators who know the communities better and are better known by the stakeholders.  
Inequality has been shown (for example in Easterly, 2005; Easterly et al., 2005; and Chong and 
Gradstein, 2005) to be positively associated with underdevelopment through its effect on 
hindering the build up of high quality institutions due to political polarization in highly 
unequal countries, among other channels. A recent report by the Inter-American Development 
                                              
26 For the relationship between regulatory commitment and macroeconomic shocks, including exchange rate risks, 
see Harris (2003). 
27 Attention has focused on two types of institutions, those protecting property rights and those enabling private 
contracts among individuals. See Acemoglu (2004).  
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Bank stresses the importance of politics in sustaining reforming policies in developing 
countries.
28 
In infrastructure industries, the importance of institutions
29 is mainly driven by the sunk nature 
of the massive investments needed, which is the source of a time inconsistency problem (see the 
beginning of Section 2 and Subsection 4.2), highlighted by Levy and Spiller (1996), Shirley et 
al. (2000), Noll (2000), Noll and Shirley (2002) and Newbery (2000), among others. There is no 
question that many countries have considerable unsatisfied demand and that they face major 
difficulties in inducing sufficient investment to meet their capacity needs – at least at an 
acceptable cost of capital. Hence, the role of the regulatory institutions is crucial in providing 
the credibility that will support the necessary investment flows. Specific regulatory institutions 
would not be necessary if contracts between consumers (represented through voting in the 
democratic political process) and investors were self-enforceable, and long term interaction 
between agents could sustain cooperation. A high discount factor (agents adopting a long term 
view) is one of the factors yielding cooperation. Self-enforcing mechanisms are studied by 
Spiller and Tommasi (2005), Newbery (2000) and Levine et al. (2005) among others. The latter 
show that self-enforced cooperation is actually harder to achieve in regulation than in other 
fields such as monetary policy, because slow depreciation and slow demand growth increase the 
length of “temptation periods,” which are those periods in which investments provide services 
without being remunerated, and therefore policy-makers may succumb to the temptation to 
renege on previous agreements. 
When cooperation through punishment threats or reputation cannot be sustained, either rules 
or specific institutions are necessary to avoid under-investment or hold up as results. Rules 
have the problem that they may not be robust to unforeseen contingencies. Spiller and 
Tommasi (2003 and 2005) show that a condition for rigid rules to arise in equilibrium is that 
the divergence in politicians’ interests concerning the issue at hand should be more extreme 
than the volatility of the underlying economic and technological shocks. Utility regulation, 
particularly in the early years, seems to be more characterized by distributional aspects than by 
the importance of adaptation to technological shocks, hence the appeal of a solution based on 
rules. But, in practice, rule-based solutions seem to lose effectiveness after some time. 
The primacy granted to institutional or governance problems in the economic analysis of 
regulatory reform contrasts, according to Spiller, to the primacy given to capture in the Chicago 
School tradition or the primacy given to market power in the Toulouse Incentives School. The 
institutional determinants of private investment in infrastructure have been studied more 
closely precisely by those authors who followed the path traced by the influential contribution 
of Levy and Spiller (1996), which has recently been expanded by Spiller and Tommasi (2003 
and 2005). These authors propose a conceptual framework for the study of regulation which 
distinguishes between regulatory governance and regulatory incentives. The former comprises 
those mechanisms which limit government discretion and solve conflicts between firms and 
regulators; the latter is related to norms involving price regimes, subsidies, interconnection 
rates and entry policies. As mentioned above, the main issues related to governance stem from 
the temptation for governments to renege on commitments previously made with firms which 
incurred sunk costs to invest in infrastructure. Especially for LDCs, the credibility of 
                                              
28 See IADB (2006). 
29 Holburn and Spiller (2002) stress that what matters for the success of reforms is the institutional framework, more 
than industry structure, different industry structures being compatible with success or failure.  
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commitments not to carry out expropriation activities,
30 (which may foster electoral support via  
potential short term benefits for consumers, such as lower prices), is crucial for the ability to 
secure often badly needed investment in infrastructure. Such credibility is linked to the 
institutional endowment of a country. Generic laws, in combination with strong presidential 
systems, for instance, create problems of a lack of credibility in many Latin American 
countries; Chile is a virtuous exception, as detailed legislation sufficed to attract investment 
even in the absence of regulatory independence. 
Along these lines, Henisz (2000) and Henisz and Zelner (2001) show how a “political 
constraints” index, measuring the extent of checks and balances which limit wide fluctuations 
in policy orientation, is strongly associated with network penetration in telecommunications 
and overall growth rates. The index is mainly based on a combination of veto power in 
independent branches and the breadth of the ideological spectrum; the results of the data 
analysis in a large set of countries in the 1960-1994 period are interpreted by Henisz and 
Zelner (2001) as evidence of the importance of credible protection for investors. 
Work on generic microeconomic policies has stressed the complexities of commitment 
problems. Bardhan (2005) points out that commitment problems may appear not only between 
policy makers and the private sector, but also between the public (the blockers) and the policy 
makers, when the public fails to reward potentially efficient policies with re-election, due to 
fears of a change in the political equilibrium that makes the blockers appear among the 
political losers. Commitment problems may have a “positive” side (not rewarding welfare 
enhancing activities, such as investment) or a “negative” side (baling out failing projects). 
Bardhan (2005) stresses the potential tensions between procedural and participatory democracy 
and the tendency in democratic unequal societies for the relatively poor majority to undermine 
the property rights of the rich. 
4.2. The Independence Debate 
One potential way to alleviate the time inconsistency problem in infrastructure policy, which 
has been explored recently both in developing and in developed countries, is regulatory 
independence.
31 If contracts (private contracts or concession contracts) are possible, discretional 
regulation is less necessary. However, complete contracts are even more problematic in 
developing countries than in developed ones. Discretional regulation can be replaced by ex ante 
rules,
32 but these tend to perform poorly if there are unforeseen contingencies (and it was 
already mentioned above that it is more difficult to write complete contracts in developing 
countries than in developed ones). Besides, in many cases regulation and contracts are 
                                              
30 This is the “overarching” problem in utilities regulation according to Spiller and Tommasi (2005). Only when this 
problem is fixed or at least alleviated, can optimal contracts, such as those prescribed by the incentives literature (see 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993), be implemented. 
31 Following Gómez-Ibáñez (2003), spreading the ownership interests widely among the public (another mechanism 
to alleviate hold up problems that has sometimes been suggested) is not a panacea, because widespread stock 
ownership is problematic in underdeveloped capital markets with poor legal systems. 
32 In monetary policy, as Dixit (2003) warns, it is difficult to sustain central bank independence if this is not 
accompanied by reputational or other self-enforcing mechanisms. Gómez-Ibáñez (2003) argues that it is hard to 
regulate well, and one should only regulate when it is essential and with the simplest and least intrusive scheme 
possible. It is this lesson that lies behind this author’s basic preference for private contracts over concession contracts 
and concessions over discretionary regulation, but incomplete contracts and widespread renegotiation (see Guasch, 
2004) make the solution difficult for developing countries.  
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complementary, because i) some sort of supervision is necessary to enforce previous agreements 
and react to unforeseen contingencies or contract renegotiations; and ii) discretional, 
independent regulation needs to be accompanied by mechanisms of social control, 
accountability, and adequate procedures, if it is to obtain social legitimacy and market 
credibility. 
The following picture of an extensive form game summarizes, with the simplest of models, the 
time inconsistency problem in regulation that gives rise to the “independence” solution: 
 
 
In the game described in the picture, first a firm makes a decision on whether to undertake a 
specific investment (for example, a hydroelectric generation plant) or not, and next the 
regulator, if the firm has invested, decides whether to fix a price that remunerates the 
investment, or to expropriate this investment (zero price). The payoff of the firm is P-I, whereas 
the payoff of the (consumer welfare maximizing) regulator is 2I-P. By backwards induction, if 
the firm has invested (I=1), the regulator will rationally fix P=0, and, anticipating this, the firm 
will not invest (I=0). Hence, in a sub-game perfect equilibrium, there is no investment. More 
realistic settings would include many other real world details, but if there is no commitment 
and assets are sunk. Under-investment would remain a serious concern, perhaps in the form of 
poor maintenance or the use of inefficient technologies. The expropriation of the quasi-rents 
derived from specific investments
33 may not necessarily take the form of overly low prices, but 
it can take other forms, such as unexpected investment requirements, costly unanticipated 
quality improvements, or requirements to hire inefficient staff. Policy makers may follow this 
path and still benefit from the (already existing) investments. Ex ante, however, investors will 
anticipate this, and investment levels will be sub-optimal. The opportunity cost of reneging will 
depend on country characteristics, such as the institutional endowment, the degree of 
                                              
33 The relationship between sunk investments and income distribution is nicely described by Newbery (2000, p. 387): 
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inequality, or the nature of the fiscal systems.
34 In countries with skewed income distributions, 
governments pay a political price in terms of not satisfying the median (relatively poor) voter if 
they do not renege on promises made to remunerate specific investments. The problem may be 
alleviated by long term contracts, repeated interactions, reputational mechanisms or institutions 
that make credible that the P=0 path will not be taken. Historically, public ownership (the state 
internalizing the firm’s problem) has been a way to alleviate time inconsistency, but in recent 
decades policy makers in many countries have reached the conclusion that the costs of public 
ownership in terms of public funds and inefficient practices outweighed its benefits. Hence the 
solution of privatizing and strategically delegating to a relatively pro-industry regulator, in a 
similar way to how governments delegate to an inflation-averse central banker (see Levine et 
al., 2005).
35 In terms of the encompassing model presented at the beginning of Section 2, now 
the government delegates in Period 1 to a relatively pro-industry regulator, who has discretion 
to choose a price in Period 2 to maximize  () () S Pp α +Θ with  1. α >  Then investment can 
reach first-best levels again if the government is able to commit to the new institutional 
arrangement (note that the commitment problem is not solved, but re-located). The need to 
appoint authorities with a high expertise in complex matters and to avoid policy polarization
36 
reinforces the arguments in favor of delegation.  
Spiller and Tommasi (2005) present an interpretation of Spiller and Urbiztondo (1994), a paper 
on the dilemmas of political appointees versus professional civil servants, in terms of regulatory 
independence, claiming that the probability of observing independent agencies is higher in 
systems characterized by divided government. Spiller’s argument is that the use of political 
appointees
37 (“including independent agencies”) arises from the fact that in systems 
characterized by divided government, the executive has less control over the professional 
bureaucracy, as the latter will naturally tend to be aligned with the legislature, a political 
institution that tends to be longer lasting than the executive. Spiller and Tommasi (2005, p.531) 
claim that in a system with division of powers, “legislative specificity will most probably not be 
the norm, as legislative costs will be high and preference homogeneity among the members of 
the legislature will most probably be low, increasing the costs of reversing agencies and courts. 
It is under these circumstances where we can expect agency independence.” The positive 
correlation between independence and divided governments remains to be tested across 
countries, to our knowledge. 
An issue related to specialized regulators is their possible proximity to the industry and its 
interests. It is not unusual that in new regulatory agencies a fair proportion of the staff and 
officials come from the historically incumbent firm. However, that is precisely one of the 
objectives of strategic delegation: to take into account the rents of the industry. But an 
independent regulator must not value industry rents excessively, because that would yield 
overly high prices, possibly getting close to monopoly prices, which is socially costly. This 
menas that there is a socially optimal level of weight α that the regulator must attach to 
industry rents, just as there is a socially optimal level of “conservatism” in the independent 
                                              
34 According to Holburn and Spiller (2002), in environments where fiscal accountability has not been implemented, 
long term cooperation will be hard to achieve, as deviations will have a high short term payoff. 
35 For a review of the extensive literature on central bank independence, see Berger et al. (2001). 
36 See Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2005). 
37 An interesting empirical issue would be whether, and to what degree, appointments in regulatory agencies are i) 
sinecures for career politicans, ii) driven by strategic delegation, or iii) guided by expertise concerns, and whether the 
difference has any effect on industry outcomes.  
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central banker. Of course, there are important differences between monetary policy and 
regulation as far as optimal delegation is concerned: 
1)  There is more historical experience (and hence higher awareness of the potential problems) 
of monetary policy than with regulatory policy.
38 For example, memories of hyper-inflation 
in Germany, or in some Latin American countries, makes it easier to convince these 
countries and their authorities of the need to create institutions that are isolated from 
political short run concerns, to better focus on the solution of the inflation problem. In 
contrast, regulation of private investment in infrastructures was not the prevalent option in 
most countries, due to the prevalence of state ownership, until recently. 
2)  The fact that in infrastructure industries there may be competition (at least in some 
segments) does not have an exact analogue in central banking. As a result, regulators 
have to make more decisions, and face interest groups with divergent interests and 
with a direct stake in policy. 
3)  The role of asset depreciation and pace of demand growth makes the delegation 
solution in regulation more appealing than in central banking, but at the same time it 
makes it more difficult to sustain. That is because slow depreciation or slow demand 
growth extends the usefulness of current assets and thus increases the temptation to 
renege on past promises.
39 
4)  There is a striking difference in the nature of the task that central bankers and 
regulators are required to perform. While the central banker has to undertake one 
main task (fix the interest rate) at regular time intervals, the regulator must undertake 
multiple tasks (access and final price reviews, merger reports, cases of abuse of 
dominant position, etc.) at usually irregular time intervals. Therefore, the control that 
the public or the political “principals” can exert over regulators is much more limited, 
which is a source of political difficulties and lack of democratic legitimacy, as well as 
market credibility. More reluctance should be expected to granting regulator 
independence than to granting central bank independence, ceteris paribus. That is 
why it is important that independence is accompanied by limited and accountable 
discretion in a disciplined framework. 
The problem of course is that independence does not solve, but relocates, the commitment 
problem, and transforms itself into one of the government credibly committing not to 
undermine the independence of the regulator, which many countries have found very 
difficult.
40 In this context, the recommendations made by Guasch and Spiller (1999, p.55) about 
the criteria to take into account when appointing regulators are of interest, although they have 
to take into account the institutional endowment of each country: 
•  Prescribe professional qualifications for the personnel appointed. 
•  Involve both the executive sector and the legislative sector in the appointment. 
                                              
38 More and more, scholars (see Beato and Laffont, 2002, and Gómez-Ibáñez 2003, for example) report interesting 
accounts of private investment in infrastructures in the 19th or early 20th centuries, but probably these experiences 
do not influence contemporary public perception. 
39 See Levine et al. (2005). 
40 See Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006).  
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•  Establish a high cost of removing the regulator from her position, but contemplate the 
possibility of removal in case of proven poor behavior. 
•  Prescribe specific duties and obligations in as clear a way as possible and arbitrate an 
appeals process, involving the judicial power or another forum. 
•  Impose high standards of transparency in the regulatory process. 
However, insulating agencies from politics may have the undesired effect of maintaining 
policies that are not politically feasible in the medium to long run. Some political discretion 
that allows for well targeted concessions to stakeholders may be useful for making short term 
agreements, gaining the collaboration of some agents and increasing the political legitimacy of 
policies. Reform policies need local politicians who can build alliances that make policies 
feasible on the ground. Henisz et al. (2005) emphasize that policy reforms that have not been 
perceived as imposed from abroad, and that involve local investors, have higher political 
legitimacy than those that are seen as “foreign” solutions. 
A few countries have been effective in attracting private investment without an independent 
regulator, most notably Chile. Engel et al. (2003) mention that the protection of property rights 
in Chile must be traced back to the economic reforms in the mid-seventies. The unpleasant 
coincidence of these reforms with a brutal military dictatorship puts a question mark over the 
possibility of replicating the Chilean experience in other jurisdictions.
41 Engel and his co-
authors, moreover, claim that some of the problems in Chilean privatization may be alleviated 
with independent regulators separate from the ministries in charge of planning for 
infrastructure expansion. Spiller and Tommasi (2005) also claim that in countries such as the 
UK, with unified governments (centralized structures where the executive controls the 
legislative) the existence of independent agencies (whose statutes may be easily changed by a 
law) is not the main factor driving private investment, but it is the contract licenses that 
provide the assurance that investments will not be expropriated. The incomplete nature of such 
contracts, however, is conveniently supplemented by the works of regulatory agencies with 
qualified staff.  
On the empirical front,
42 the focus of cross-national econometric studies has been on the role of 
independent regulators in stimulating private investment (for telecoms, typically proxied by the 
total number of mainlines or mainlines per 100 inhabitants), primarily in developing countries. 
In general, data used for telecoms are better, as there is more experience with telecom 
regulation than with other utilities (although telecom regulator independence is still a very 
recent phenomenon in most countries).  
None of the econometric studies undertaken have data on regulatory processes or practice; the 
only regulatory data that exists is mainly in relation to the legal framework, which describes, 
for example, whether there is a regulatory law, whether the regulator is formally independent, 
how it is funded, etc. A major task for future research is to include evidence on regulatory 
processes and practices and how they evolve over time, (for example, the percentage of 
regulatory agency commissioners, or office heads, whose tenure is ended prematurely). The 
absence of data on regulatory processes and practices is unfortunate given that the evidence 
                                              
41 Dixit (2005) also mentions more generally the unpleasant logic behind the possibility that some dictatorships may 
be more credible in protecting the property rights of the rich. 
42 This review of the empirical studies on regulatory independence draws from Levine et al. (2005).  
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suggests that, in developing countries, the quality of the law typically exceeds the quality of its 
application and enforcement, so that the quality of the legal framework exaggerates the quality 
of regulation in practice. It means that coefficient estimates on the regulatory variable are likely 
to be downward biased because of an errors-in-variables problem. 
These problems must be added to the one of finding a common desirability of outcomes across 
a large set of countries. In spite of these difficulties, Wallsten (2001) finds that installing a 
regulatory agency separate from the relevant ministry before privatization is positively and 
significantly associated with several indicators of investment. Wallsten’s regulatory variable 
was a simple time-dated dummy of whether or not a regulator had been enacted in law. The 
same is true of the regulatory variable in the study of 86 non-OECD countries by Fink et al. 
(2002) on telecommunications. This study finds that the existence of an independent regulatory 
agency significantly augments the (positive) effect on mainline penetration of competition and 
privatization. Furthermore, Fink et al. stress the importance of sequencing in reform policies in 
telecommunications,
43 after analyzing LDC data in the 1985-1999 period. Their main result is 
that mainline penetration and efficiency enjoy substantial increases on average after 
comprehensive programs including privatization, the introduction of competition and the 
setting up of an independent regulatory entity; these beneficial effects are severely reduced if 
competition is introduced after privatization. 
Estache et al. (2006) assess the effects of private capital and independent regulatory agencies on 
telecommunications performance by using cross-country panel data from 1990 to 2003. In 
general, they find that having independent regulatory agencies positively affects affordability 
and labor productivity, but negatively affects quality.  
Gutierrez (2003) and Gual and Trillas (2004 and 2006) are the first studies to associate indices 
to regulatory institutions, in the spirit of the literature on central bank independence. Gutierrez 
(2003) estimates the effect of a seven-item index of regulatory governance on mainline density 
and efficiency for 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries. He finds that both the index and 
the three main subcomponents have a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level) on 
mainline penetration, after controlling for competition and privatization. This holds for both 
static and dynamic models and the estimated coefficients are robust to corrections for potential 
endogeneity. 
Gual and Trillas (2004) present and use an index of regulatory independence in 
telecommunications for 37 countries, constructed using principal components techniques and 
thus taking into account the correlation between the original variables. They find that legal 
independence is more likely in countries with a larger incumbent and in countries with worse 
rule of law measures. They take this as evidence the fact that incumbent firms lobby for 
independent agencies and that independence is a substitute for other ways to commit not to 
expropriate the incumbent’s quasi-rents. They find that independence has a positive but not 
significant impact on network penetration, using International Telecommunications Union data. 
Cubbin and Stern (2004) use a four-component index of regulatory independence to estimate 
the effect of regulation on investment in electricity generation in a sample of 28 developing 
countries for the period 1980–2001. They estimate fixed effects panel data models similar to 
those of Gutierrez (2003). They find that the impact of a maximum index score (i.e. a regulator 
                                              
43 See also Li and Xu (2002 and 2004) for related studies.  
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established by primary legislation, autonomous, funded from license fees or similar and with 
freedom in setting pay) is, on average, likely to increase expected long-run per capita 
generation capacity levels by around 15–25%. This is the predicted increase relative to an 
otherwise average developing country having electricity regulation conducted by a ministry 
without any supporting law. 
However, as one might expect, the estimated regulatory effects take some time to build up. The 
estimated long-run impact of a regulator established for less than 12 months on per capita 
generation capacity was zero whereas for a regulator (autonomous and/or ministry) established 
for at least three years, it was in the 25–35% range. Similarly, a simple quadratic formulation 
suggested that the long-run impact continued to increase for over ten years. Finally, lags 
appear to be long. Hence, the results from an error correction model showed that only about 
12% of the expected long-run regulation effects on generation capacity levels could be 
expected to occur in the first year. All of these results provide support for the expectation that 
considerable time is needed (a) to build up regulatory capacity; and (b) for the regulatory 
agency to establish its reputation vis-à-vis investors. 
Wallsten (2002) focuses on the sequence of regulatory reforms concerning independence of the 
regulator and privatization. When privatization processes enjoyed wide political support, 
arguments were often raised in favor of speeding up such processes. However, his analysis, 
which makes use of data from 200 countries from 1985 to 1999 on performance in 
telecommunication industries, stresses the importance of establishing an independent regulatory 
authority before the beginning of the privatization process, with high benefits in investment, 
fixed telephone penetration, and cellular penetration. 
The empirical literature on testing whether (and, if so, how and why) utility regulatory agencies 
help alleviate the time inconsistency problems associated with private investment is, however, 
still in its infancy with respect to, for instance, the independent central bank literature. 
Nevertheless, the relevant empirical literature is increasingly providing strong evidence that a 
positive degree of regulatory independence may have a positive impact in some contexts. 
4.3. Regulatory Governance 
There are other aspects of regulatory governance
44 that go beyond independence and, although 
important, have been less emphasized by the academic literature:
45 
i)  An important decision is whether regulatory agencies should be collective bodies or 
single person organs. The main advantages of the single person regulator are swift 
decision making, clear accountability, administrative cost minimization, predictable 
outcomes, and absence of partisan allocation of positions. The main advantages of 
collegiate agencies are resistance to individual agendas, resistance to capture, 
multiple perspectives, and the possibility of staggering terms to lessen links with the 
incumbent government. The optimal decision (see Guasch and Spiller, 1999) will 
depend on the tasks that the regulator must undertake, the context of the country or 
industry and the global institutional framework. Guasch and Spiller (1999) conclude 
that resistance to capture should prevail, and that this tilts the balance for 
                                              
44 For an overview of related issues, see Brown et al. (2006). 
45 However, for a previous review of similar issues, see Estache and Martimort (1999).  
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developing countries in favor of collegiate bodies, but even that must be calibrated 
in a local context.  
ii)  Another important decision is whether to create multi-utility agencies. The trend in 
some developed countries such as the UK or Spain is to create agencies that oversee 
related industries (OFCOM and OFGEM in the UK, CNE in Spain), which facilitates 
transparency and reputation and reduces instability and regulatory risk. In 
developing countries, the scarcity of qualified personnel and the existence of 
capture risks reinforce the validity of this option (taken for example by Bolivia), but 
the drawback is that multi-utility agencies also reinforce the multi-task problem of 
controlling regulators and make their social control more difficult (see Laffont, 
2005; Beato and Laffont, 2002).  
iii)  Finally, there is the issue of whether regulation should be performed at national 
level or in a decentralized way. Institutional endowment here is crucial, as is 
technology. For example, electricity regulation in Argentina takes place at the 
provincial level (like in Canada and Australia, where it takes place at the state 
level), whereas in many other countries it is centralized. Not many studies have 
undertaken an in-depth analysis of the optimal allocation of regulatory powers, 
either from a theoretical or from an empirical point of view. The issue is mentioned 
by Aubert and Laffont (2002), Laffont (2005) and Gómez-Ibáñez (2003),
46 but there 
is clearly a scarcity of academic work in this field, if compared, for example, with 
its sister discipline of fiscal federalism.
47 What are the determinants of the allocation 
of regulatory decisions in the vertical chain of government? Both from a positive 
and normative perspective, the potential determinants that have been mentioned in 
the literature, besides technology and regulatory endowment, are: 
•  Jurisdictional spillovers, which, for example, would make electricity 
transmission (where the physical rules do not have much respect for political 
boundaries) a central or supra-national policy, but distribution and supply a 
regional, decentralized issue. 
•  Capture potential. It is not clear whether capture can be higher at the central or 
at the local level. It depends on features of the political systems and on the 
details of the supply and demand for lobbying.
48 The relative potential for 
capture across levels of government varies with space and time. 
•  Asymmetric information. This gives an advantage to decentralized regulation, 
but yardstick competition mechanisms would require some level of central 
information or at least of coordination of dispersed information. 
•  Commitment capacity at the different government levels, which depends on the 
quality of institutions and the rule of law. 
•  Capacity to recruit specialized personnel. This is particularly relevant in those 
industries that experience technological change and in those countries where 
                                              
46 See also Brennan (2003) and Smith (2000). 
47 See for example Oates (1999). 
48 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000).  
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highly trained personnel are particularly scarce, which tilts the balance in favor 
of central agencies. 
In the literature on fiscal federalism, the Oates theorem
49 states that if policy makers are 
benevolent and there are no jurisdictional spillovers, the lower government level dominates the 
higher one because it better reflects citizens’ preferences and provides superior information. 
Like many important theorems in economics, this one provides a benchmark, and must be 
interpreted as an invitation to investigate, in each particular case, if any of the theorem’s 
assumptions do not hold. Of course, in many countries the timing of reforms does not allow for 
a first-best fine tuning of the right policy location (as it often does not allow for the perfect 
fine tuning of firms’ boundaries or of firms’ governance), but the analysis of “regulatory 
federalism” may help in identifying those features of governance that must be reformed to 
make a given policy location work in the best long-term interest of consumers. An overall 
preference for central regulation (as for example reflected in Gómez-Ibáñez, 2003), or for 
decentralized regulation (as reflected in Qian and Weingast, 1997; and Weingast, 2003, and 
their theory of market-preserving federalism), seems unjustified. And sometimes some role for 
both levels simultaneously in one policy area may be necessary, as for some forms of supra-
local support, as argued for example in Bardhan (2005, p.124). 
4.4. Capture 
As we have just seen, the risk of capture conditions any of the previous decisions on regulatory 
governance. But capture encompasses a wide range of different phenomena, not necessarily 
with the same implications. For example, while it is widely accepted that public ownership 
invites some forms of corruption (patronage, soft budget constraints), private ownership makes 
possible other forms of collusion between private sector agents and policy makers (regulatory 
capture, favoritism at auctions, collusion between politicians and managers at the expense of 
voters and shareholders). The same or very similar models of regulatory capture can be used to 
address different phenomena such as direct bribing of policymakers, the “revolving doors” 
phenomenon, and presenting biased or partial information to regulators. It is clear that these 
forms of lobbying have very different implications in terms of political legitimacy or even 
legality.  
A form of costly capture may be to appoint managers with a political or bureaucratic 
background (see Joskow et al., 1993 and 1996). More generally Straub (2005) speaks of “payroll 
corruption.” A hypothetical example of this would be if just prior to full privatization of, say, 
an electricity firm, the government appointed as chairman of the firm a typical archetype of 
machine politics who learned his skills in the corridors of power, although he had no 
background whatsoever in the electricity industry or even in the management of any firm. After 
the firm is fully privatized (although the government may keep a golden share for several years) 
the investors decide to keep this chairman because they rationally think that he may be able to 
achieve political advantages in a politicized regulatory arena (after all, he will be familiar with 
the corridors of power). Levy and Spiller (1996) argue that infrastructure sectors are inherently 
politicized, given the fact that all voters are consumers, that regulated firms are very large, and 
the sunk nature of their investments. 
 
                                              
49 Oates (1999).  
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It seems clear that in many developing countries, and most notably in Latin America, some 
degree of capture
50 has been necessary to attract foreign capital in the utilities sector. Levine et 
al. (2006) provide a first theoretical attempt to show that an optimal degree of firms’ influence 
on regulators may alleviate both the underinvestment problem and the ratchet effect problem 
(under-provision of effort), in the absence of regulatory commitment. Evans et al. (2006) 
compare such a “capture solution” to the “independence solution” to the commitment problem. 
In terms of the encompassing model presented at the beginning of Section 2 above, now the 
firm, besides having the possibility of incurring investment expenditures in Period 1 to achieve 
lower fixed costs in Period 2, has the possibility, also in Period 1, of spending resources on 
lobbying contributions,L , so that the firm and the regulator reach an agreement that a certain 
regulated price will prevail in Period 2. The intertemporal profits of the firm are now: 
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( i f k p D c p L i P + − − + − − = Θ δ  
And the regulator chooses the price to maximize  () ()() () , ' 0, Sp L p L ββ +Θ > so that the 
weight of profits in the regulator’s objective function positively depends on lobbying 
expenditures. 
This may also yield first-best investment levels, although the solution is more costly than 
delegating to an independent regulator because the lobbying expenditures must be covered by 
prices. 
There are obvious limitations to this strategy in terms of political legitimacy. In the recent past, 
as mentioned in the introduction, there has been a backlash against privatization and foreign 
investment (most dramatically in Bolivia, but in general in all Latin American countries to 
different degrees, see Kessides 2004). There is a heavy cost in terms of some sort of capture (and 
therefore rent) that must be allowed to attract private investment and effort. It is then not 
surprising that in countries with very weak welfare states, and a very high cost of public funds, 
poor citizens focus on these rents to demand redistributive policies. 
Ugaz and Waddams-Price (2003, p.11) argue that incentives can only work if those responsible 
for making efficiencies keep a significant part of the rewards. If the results of the effort are all 
immediately redistributed (for example to other workers or consumers) then they are unlikely to 
be realized in the first place. There is a clear trade-off between providing incentives for 
efficiency and increased investment and how quickly those benefits are shared with other 
parties involved in the process. However, the same authors admit that “The World Bank itself 
has increasingly focused its attention on the effects on the poor of reform packages which it 
supports. (...) Despite recognition of some trade-off between efficiency, incentives and 
redistribution, some shift in emphasis is evident.” This follows, according to the authors, a 
situation where regulation has been weak in the face of firms. They argue that Spanish firms 
have been strong enough (between themselves, with interlocking directorates, and between 
them and the banks) to capture Spanish and Latin American regulators. For the case of Chile, 
the authors mention that “a related problem, affecting both the capacity of active participation 
of consumers in the process and the supply of competent regulatory services, is the lack of a 
                                              
50 Engel et al. (2003) point out that the Chilean Ministry of Public Works granted public refinancing on franchised 
concessions even after the roads where built and sunk. They find two (not necessarily alternative) explanations for 
this. First, bailing out current operators gives an incentive to them to participate in future franchise auctions (this 
argument would work if public workers were farsighted). And second, companies captured public workers (some 
officials of the ministry had to resign due to corruption allegations).  
28 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
sufficiently large pool of trained regulators. Those available quickly become engaged working 
for the companies, either directly (with much higher financial rewards than the government 
offers) or representing them on regulatory boards. This leaves few independent professionals 
whose opinions can influence the debate, help consumers to articulate demands, and make 
regulation more transparent and participatory.” 
On the theoretical front, Laffont (2000), after reviewing the more traditional literature of the 
Chicago school, presents a model where the risk of capture makes it socially optimal to reduce 
regulatory discretion so that the stakes of regulation are low (the impact of regulation on profits 
is diminished). The effects of regulatory stakes on lobbying are long lasting. Costly lobbying 
decisions by firms usually have a long term nature. As mentioned above, regulated utilities often 
hire managers with a bureaucratic background or with political connections. This sacrifices inter-
temporal profits if the firm pays a cost in terms of efficiency and/or if the manager is 
compensated by an incentive mechanism related to profits. Similarly, a regulated firm may hire a 
lobbying firm through a long term contract; it makes sense that such a contract is long term 
because the lobbying firm must develop relationships with regulators, politicians, and the media. 
Then this contract may also be related to performance in terms of the firm’s profits. 
We are not the first to claim that a limited degree of capture may be a feature conducing to 
higher investment in a less than perfect world (i.e., in the absence of commitment). Armstrong 
and Vickers (1996, p.303) argue that “as to the question of industry-specific regulatory bodies 
versus ones with wider scope, we do not see decisive arguments either way. The danger of 
capture might argue against industry-specific bodies, but a degree of capture might enhance the 
credibility of commitment to allow an adequate return on investment.” They make this claim in 
the context of the analysis of the right policies in the regulation and liberalization of former 
communist countries to alleviate under-investment in sunk assets, which the authors view as 
the main problem transition countries face in the reform of telecommunications. 
Along similar lines, two papers (to our knowledge) argue that the “revolving doors” 
phenomenon should be allowed to some extent: first Che (1995), who makes this claim on the 
basis of the prospect of future employment in the industry, among other effects, which 
increases the efforts of the regulator, with some spillover effects on his activity in pursuing 
public interest; secondly, Salant (1995) maintains that staggered terms between managers and 
regulators lead the latter to think twice before reneging on sunk investments, if they have some 
chance of becoming managers in the future. 
Other papers emphasize the positive informational effects of some degree of capture, such as 
Grossman and Helpman (2001), who show how lobbies provide information on the productive 
environment that is useful although biased, or provide information on the behavior of 
regulators that is useful to political principals. 
Table 3 compacts the empirical studies reviewed in this section and in Sub-Section 3.2. To 
summarize this section, institutions determine how the time inconsistency problem in the 
presence of sunk investments is addressed. An independent regulator is theoretically a sound 
proposition, but it is more difficult to sustain than central bank independence. Other regulatory 
governance issues matter as much, and also determine to a great extent the particular ways in 
which the commitment problem is addressed. When other more desirable and legitimate ways of 
achieving commitment are absent, some degree of capture is left as an option to alleviate 
underinvestment (but at the risk of triggering a political backlash). 
Table 3   
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Empirical Studies About Macroeconomics and Institutions of Regulatory Reform 
Easterly and Servén (2003)  Effects of cuts in public expenditure 
in infrastructure in Latin America  
The quest for expenditure reduction 
results in an inefficient strategy in 
the long term, as public and private 
investment are often 
complementary. Privatization 
brought about significant benefits 
only in telecommunications. 
Campos, Estache, Martín and 
Trujillo (2003) 
Macroeconomic effects of 
privatization, Latin America, 1985-
1998 
Benefits from reforms in 
transportation (airport, railway, 
ports, roads) on income, no 
significant effects from reforms in 
utilities 
Benitez, Chisari and Estache 
(2003) 
Effect of reforms in utilities in 
Argentina in the 1990s 
Positive welfare effects were 
insufficient to compensate for 
negative effects of credit shocks 
Henisz and Zelner (2001)  Impact of checks and balances 
summarized in a political 
constraints index, large set of 
countries, 1960-1994 
Political constraints foster network 
penetration in telecommunications 
and overall growth, as they 
strengthen the credibility of investor 
protection. 
Wallsten (2002)  Effects of sequencing of regulatory 
reforms in telecommunications, 200 
countries, 1985-1999 
The set-up of an independent 
regulator before privatization is key 
in achieving beneficial effects on 
penetration and efficiency 
Estache, Goicoechea and 
Manacorda (2006) 
Effects of privatization and 
independence, cross-country panel, 
1990-2003 
Independence of the regulator in 
privatization reforms positively 
affect affordability and labor 
productivity, but has negative 
effects on quality 
Gutierrez (2003)  Effect of sound regulatory 
governance index, 22 Latin 
American countries, 1980-1997 
Positive effect on mainline 
penetration, even after controlling 
for privatization and competition 
(which in turn also have positive 
effects) 
Gual and Trillas (2006)  Impact of regulatory independence 
as defined in a new index, 37 
countries 
Independence is correlated with 
strong incumbents and weak rule of 
law, and is used as a means to 
provide credibility not to expropriate 
investors’ rents 
Cubbin and Stern (2004)  Independence index, 28 countries, 
1980-2001: effects in the electricity 
sector 
High independence increases long-
run capacity generation by 25% 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we survey studies that analyze how the specific features of developing countries 
condition reforms in infrastructure industries. We also summarize research that examines the 
effects of reforms on income groups and on macroeconomic performance, and assess how  
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regulatory institutions provide a link between distributive issues and actual policies. The 
conclusions that we can extract from our review of the literature are the following: 
1)  Expectations about private sector involvement in infrastructures were probably too high 
in the early 1990s, and have already been lowered, partly for good reasons. Private sector 
provision has inherent political difficulties, both because the firms’ rents necessary to 
attract investment become more visible, and because prices are also more visible than 
widely dispersed and highly opaque fiscal deficits (usual under public ownership and 
provision). Still, a reversion to the old paradigm of public provision and ownership is not 
happening and should not necessarily happen. If private sector involvement is 
accompanied by a well functioning regulatory framework, efficiency gains are likely, and 
these can be distributed in a way that leads to politically sustainable reforms. 
2)  In regulatory reform, efficiency and distribution are hardly separable. High income 
inequality exacerbates the dilemmas between rents and incentives inherent in the 
design of optimal regulation, and may seriously undermine the political feasibility of 
regulatory reforms. A high cost of using the tax system, coupled with enormous social 
needs and high inequality, imply high pressure to redistribute any rents known to be 
generated. In particular, there is a high short term opportunity cost of not reneging on 
the commitment not to expropriate the quasi-rents necessary to remunerate sunk 
investments in infrastructure sectors. 
3)  Competition and privatization are feasible
51 in developing countries, and have the 
potential to increase efficiency and at the same time benefit the poorest segments of 
the population. The empirical evidence is not conclusive as to the real effects of 
existing reforms on income inequality. The most that can be said is that regulatory 
reform did not improve the acute inequalities of some regions, such as Latin America 
(although there are exceptions, most notably Chile). Perception and transparent firms’ 
rents greatly complicated the politics of reforms. The main obstacles are not to be 
found in technological or economic aspects, but within the realm of politics and 
institutions. This does not mean that economists have already done their job, but they 
have to contribute to understanding and at least propose how to alleviate the political 
and institutional hazards. As López de Silanes and Chong (2003, p. 44) argue, “the 
understanding of the political economy mechanisms behind the causes of failure 
should be used to improve privatization, not to stop it.” 
4)  In the quest for effective universal service policies, distributional concerns become 
particularly critical. Universal service programs should create special funds (from all 
operators that achieve a given market share, or from general taxation if the tax 
system is sufficiently- developed), using the vertical chain of government to carefully 
target subsidies. Direct subsidies are preferable to cross subsidies because they do not 
                                              
51 An illuminating success story (which also illustrates the potentially constructive role that economists can play) is 
the case of transport in Chile’s capital, Santiago. In 2005, a new bus system that replaced the inefficient previous one 
was in place after a competitive concession bidding process; new inner city toll highways allowed commuters and 
visitors to go in and out of the capital in less than half an hour; and new underground parking spaces had been in 
operation for two or three years in several central areas. Foreign investors participated in all these concessions. 
Chilean economists had been very active in the debate and public policy process that preceded these changes. See 
Díaz et al. (2004) and Engel et al. (2003). Some commentators argued that these spectacular changes boosted the 
chances of the official candidate in the two-round presidential election of December 2005/January 2006. Post-
contracting problems, however, were not absent: some operators of the new bus system complained that “pirate” 
buses were operating in some of the concessioned routes (see newspaper El Mercurio, December 23, 2005).  
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jeopardize liberalization, but they must run in parallel with fiscal policy reforms and 
with an improvement in the quality of government (otherwise we would be back to 
the previous stage, where company deficits were financed through opaque fiscal 
deficits). Better governments and better markets are complements. 
5)  Institutions matter, and in regulation this is often associated with the option of granting 
independence to some agencies to take decisions within clearly defined frameworks. But 
other dimensions of governance must also be taken into account: accountability, 
procedures, decentralization, coordination, legitimacy. Importing institutional quality 
through links with international agencies or regulators from other countries may be useful, 
as long as it is not perceived as an imposition on local democracies. 
6)  Regulatory reform should be part of an overall strategy to increase growth and 
develop sound institutions.52 Some characteristics of developing countries (e.g. tax 
systems and existing levels of corruption) should not be just taken as given, and 
should be addressed at the same time or prior to regulatory reform. 
7)  Reforms directed at increasing private investment had better results in the 
telecommunications sector than in other sectors. Among other possible determinants 
of this difference, increasing demand growth, higher scope for competition, and faster 
asset depreciation may account for part of the differential. These features make the 
credibility of commitments not to expropriate sunk investments more sustainable. 
Future research looks promising in the following areas: 
•  Establishing rigorously, through a well-structured empirically
53 testable 
theoretical model, the link between inequality, politics, reform and investment 
that has been informally formulated throughout this survey.  
•  Combining theoretical and empirical work to better establish the link between 
formal independence and practical mechanisms to achieve institutional 
commitment compatible with limited discretion.  
•  Considering more in depth the key instruments to increase access by the poor. 
Although some lessons across sectors are useful, these instruments should in 
general be sector specific. For example, broadband expansion and policies to fight 
the digital divide
54 should be carefully analyzed, to find the best combination 
towards important goals such as lowering entry barriers and fostering new 
product development, on the one hand, and developing a sound public sector 
policy to subsidize access, on the other.
55  
 
                                              
52 Far-sighted firms should thus lobby for policies that enhance growth opportunities and the 
development of welfare states, because such policies would sustain political majorities in favour of 
reforms. Baron (1996) stresses the importance of firms’ non-market strategies. 
53 A key data source for empirical work in this field is Wallsten et al. (2004). 
54 Soria (2002) points out that Internet development will be even more related to human development 
than technology adoption is. 
55 See Wallsten (2005). This paper provides a quantification of the existence and importance of the digital divide.  
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